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SECURITIES REGULATION—TENTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS
LYING EXECUTIVES TO ESCAPE SECTION 10(B)
LIABILITY, LEAVING INVESTORS REMEDILESS
ROBERT C. UHL*
IN ANDERSON V. SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC.,1the Tenth Circuit incorrectly held that investors failed to es-
tablish a cogent, compelling inference of scienter sufficient to
prove that Spirit AeroSystems (Spirit) violated Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s Rule 10b-5.2 The majority opinion focuses
on four Spirit executives’ forward-looking statements about the
company’s projected ability to meet cost targets,3 but the major-
ity seems to ignore the falsity of those same executives’ state-
ments about then-present facts, arbitrarily eliminating part of
the plaintiff investors’ claim. Although Section 10(b) analysis
concerns two categories of statements, “those projecting future
performance, and those reflecting past performance,”4 the
Tenth Circuit’s decision drastically narrows the scope of this in-
quiry, allowing company executives to escape 10(b) liability for
inaccurately depicting a project’s factual past performance.5
The two categories “differ markedly for purposes of a securities
fraud claim,”6 so the court should have preserved the investors’
remedy and concluded that the investors did establish a cogent
and compelling inference of scienter for the false statements
about the then-current status of a project, as these indepen-
dently pass the test.7
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2018; B.B.A., Finance,
University of Notre Dame, 2015.
1 827 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2016).
2 5 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2016); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2016).
3 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1251.
4 Id. at 1252 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 Id. at 1253.
6 Id. at 1252.
7 Id. at 1256.
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A class of investors of Spirit AeroSystems Holdings sued the
company and four executive officers for misrepresenting and
failing to disclose cost overruns and production delays for three
important projects after the company lost nearly a half-billion
dollars.8 Spirit, which produces commercial aerostructures,
agreed to supply parts for the Gulfstream Aerospace Corpora-
tion’s G280 and G650 aircraft and the Boeing Company’s 787
“Dreamliner” aircraft.9 Spirit used a program accounting
method for the 787 project to report a profit rate based on ac-
tual historical costs of this, and similar type projects, plus future
estimated costs.10 These factors created a “cost curve” that de-
scribed the average cost per unit over the course of the contract,
and because Spirit expected to benefit from a “learning curve”
as the project progressed, the cost curve was downward sloping,
such that the average cost per unit would decrease as Spirit pro-
duced more units.11 According to Confidential Witness Ten, in-
dividual project leaders updated estimates for the project’s cost
curve quarterly, allowing upper management to see whether the
project was “on the curve” (meeting expectations), “above the
curve” (over budget), or “below the curve” (under budget).12
Confidential Witness Ten, who prepared these projections,
also explained that the data showed that the 787 project “costs
were much higher than expected,” so the project was above its
cost curve.13 Moreover, the witness stated that two of the execu-
tives named in the suit actually received the quarterly reports
indicating that the 787 project was not properly tracking its fore-
casted cost curve.14 However, these executives instead informed
investors that the project was on schedule, “tracking per plan to
8 Id. at 1236, 1251 (majority opinion).
9 Id. at 1235.
10 Id. at 1253 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Jon
Ostrower, Boeing’s Unique Accounting Method Helps Improve Profit Picture, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-unique-accounting-
method-helps-improve-profit-picture-1475522362 [https://perma.cc/N2DS-
PKDR].
11 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1253 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
12 Id.
13 Id.; see also Benjamin Zhang, Boeing’s Most Turbulent Saga of the Past Decade is
Finally Over, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/boe-
ing-787-dreamliner-terrible-teens-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/8LJJ-YS95] (while
Anderson does not offer specifics on why the Boeing 787 project was so over
budget, Zhang’s article may provide an explanation).
14 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1253 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
2017] CASE NOTE 243
identify and implement cost improvements,” and that the pro-
ject was “very much on plan and where we expected to be.”15 A
few quarters later, these executives reiterated their position, em-
phasizing that “we continue to improve our unit cost perform-
ance, as planned,” that the company expected to “continue to
track [the 787 project] curve,” and that the 787 project was “go-
ing to keep coming down the curve.”16
Spirit did caution investors to the risks of these projects in its
public SEC filings.17 Spirit’s 10-Q near the beginning of the class
period stated that these projects “continue to pose a risk of addi-
tional charges and/or forward-loss” based on cost pressures, a
10-K reiterated this sentiment, and even toward the end of the
class period, multiple 10-Qs highlighted this serious risk of for-
ward-losses.18 Despite the seemingly standard “risk of loss” lan-
guage issued throughout the project, Spirit publicly maintained
its ability to meet production deadlines and break even (or even
gain) on these projects.19 Yet to the investors’ surprise, the com-
pany announced that it expected to lose “hundreds of millions
of dollars on the three projects,” causing the company’s stock
price to plummet roughly thirty percent.20 The plaintiff inves-
tors brought this suit alleging that the executives’ statements
misled investors and artificially inflated the company’s stock
price before Spirit recorded the forward-loss charge.21
A claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires plead-
ing scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manip-
ulate, or defraud, or recklessness.”22 The court weighs the
plaintiff’s inference of scienter against “competing inferences
rationally drawn from the facts alleged,” and a complaint only
satisfies the pleading standard if the inference of fraudulent in-
tent is “cogent and compelling.”23 Thus, the issue before the
15 Id.
16 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 1250 (majority opinion).
18 Id. at 1249–50; Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q), at 40 (Nov. 4, 2011); Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 53 (Feb. 14, 2012); Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 40 (May 4, 2012); Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 43 (Aug. 7, 2012).
19 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1235–36.
20 Id. at 1236.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1236–37 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Adams v. Kinder-Mor-
gan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003)).
23 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 310 (2007)).
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Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the investors’ allegation
of the executives’ scienter was cogent and compelling.24 The
Tenth Circuit determined that even though Spirit’s executives
knew the projects had cost problems and might not meet pro-
duction deadlines, they most likely did not communicate these
issues because they were merely “overly optimistic” about the
project’s potential for success, not because they intentionally
misrepresented facts or recklessly ignored financial red flags.25
The court began its analysis by weighing the lack of proof of
any executive’s particular motive to falsify information against
an inference of scienter.26 Even a “general motive[ ] for man-
agement to further the interests of the corporation fail[s] to
raise an inference of scienter” the court opined.27 And while
plaintiffs do not necessarily need to show a particular motive to
prove scienter,28 “[t]he absence of a motive allegation . . . is rele-
vant.”29 The Tenth Circuit decided that it was not just relevant—
a lack of particular motive for securities fraud actually mitigated
an inference of scienter.30
Next, the court summarily dismissed the importance of the
confidential witnesses’ testimony, criticizing their positions at
Spirit as too far down the hierarchal chain to have specific
knowledge of the executives’ “mental states,” what the execu-
tives actually knew or might have known, or what the final cost
calculations were.31 The court even determined that a witness
who worked directly with one of the executives was unable to
prove anything beyond that executive’s extreme optimism be-
cause the testimony could not be definitively placed on a time-
line of events and did not suggest that the executive wished to
intentionally mislead investors.32
The investors also alleged that because these top executives
were personally in charge of the three projects, they must have
24 Id. at 1238.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1238–39.
27 Id. (quoting In re Level 3 Commc’ns, Sec. Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1347 (10th
Cir. 2001)); see also City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1269 (10th Cir.
2001).
28 Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2015).
29 In re Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 310 (2007)).
30 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1238.
31 Id. at 1243–44; see also Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981,
998 (9th Cir. 2009).
32 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1245.
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known the projects would not meet their cost forecasts.33 But
the court relied heavily on City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Compa-
nies to conclude that scienter could not be inferred solely from
the executives’ position in the company or involvement with the
projects.34 Again, the investors’ alleged inference of scienter was
deemed not cogent or compelling enough to outweigh the
court’s decision that executives were simply “overly optimistic,”
despite testimonial evidence of the executives’ attendance at
meetings where the projects were discussed.35 And while prece-
dent clearly establishes that this factor cannot be the sole reason
for a cogent and compelling inference of scienter, the court
seems to dismiss it completely without regard to its weight
among all the other arguments that the investors put forth.36
Finally, the investors argued that the existence of a recovery
plan for the 787 project, the CEO’s admission of the company’s
failure to meet projections, and Spirit’s disclosure of the risks of
loss all indicated that the executives knew of the problems and
failed to accurately communicate them.37 The investors also ar-
gued that the magnitude of the forward loss was so large ($434.6
million) that the executives must have known before they made
public statements.38 But, the court again swiftly side-stepped
these points, dismissing them as “fraud by hindsight,” too tenu-
ous to establish a cogent and compelling inference.39 Ulti-
mately, the court dismissed every one of the investor’s
arguments as insufficient on its own to reach cogent and com-
pelling, and apparently, they were not cogent and compelling
collectively either.40 The Tenth Circuit chalked the nearly half-
billion dollar loss up to the executives’ extreme over-optimism
and the company not learning as fast as its cost curves predicted,
not “a cogent and compelling inference of scienter.”41
The court’s decision appears to afford dangerous deference
to company executives to say just about anything they want with
no fear of liability to shareholders, enabling executives to hide
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1264 (10th Cir.
2001).
35 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1246.
36 Id.; see also City of Phila., 264 F.3d at 1264.
37 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1247–50.
38 Id. at 1251.
39 Id. at 1250; see City of Phila., 264 F.3d at 1261; see also In re Zagg, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2015).
40 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1251.
41 Id. at 1238, 1249.
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behind a shield of corporate “optimism.”42 The Tenth Circuit
refused to equate scienter with “failing to give adequate weight
to financial red flags” and telling investors the opposite of what
updated cost projections predicted.43 Evidently being “negligent
in failing to put together the pieces” carries no liability.44 But
while reasonable minds may differ on the culpability of the exec-
utives’ forward-looking statements, the opinion’s more glaring
issue is the court’s apparent failure to address the implications
of the executives’ false and misleading statements about then-
present facts.45
The dissent correctly highlighted this oversight, concluding
that while the investors may not have properly proved scienter
regarding the forward-looking statements, they did in fact prove
scienter for two executives’ statements about the then-current
performance of Spirit’s 787 program.46 First, the dissent sepa-
rated the two categories of statements before the court: “those
projecting future performance, and those reflecting past per-
formance;” then, it admitted that the majority was correct in its
analysis of the future statements.47 But the majority stopped its
analysis there, so the dissent argued that even though part of the
statements were opinions about the future (and thus not action-
able), the executives still inaccurately described the 787 pro-
ject’s current status, and those false statements are actionable.48
Two Spirit executives knew that the project was above its cost
curve (over budget) because Confidential Witness Ten testified
to giving them copies of the quarterly report indicating as such,
yet these executives still “repeatedly informed investors that 787
program costs were declining as planned.49
While the majority discredited the witness’s ability to testify
directly to the executives’ scienter, a court must accept the com-
plaint’s factual allegations as true in a de novo review,50 so the
witness can at least establish that the executives received these
42 See id. at 1238.
43 Id. at 1238.
44 Id. (quoting In re Level 3 Commc’ns, Sec. Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1345 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
45 See Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1251.
46 Id. at 1251.
47 Id. at 1252 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48 Id. at 1251–52.
49 Id. at 1253.
50 See id. at 1237 (majority opinion); see also Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d
658, 666 (10th Cir. 2011).
2017] CASE NOTE 247
quarterly reports.51 The majority quoted City of Philadelphia to
define recklessness,52 which the dissent also reproduced, as
“conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of or-
dinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers
or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it.”53 The dissent cor-
rectly indicates, then, that after the executives read the reports,
telling investors that the project’s costs were declining when
they were not would certainly “present[ ] a danger of misleading
buyers,” and is in fact an outright intentional lie.54 Even if the
executives had not actually read the reports, that too would be
an “extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,” re-
peatedly informing investors based on zero information.55
Taken together with all the other arguments the majority
jointly dismisses as not strong enough to create a cogent and
compelling inference—that the 787 project was key to Spirit’s
bottom line as part of its core business (twenty percent of total
revenue),56 that the magnitude of the falsity (the 787 project
alone resulted in $184 million in forward-losses, one quarter of
reported earnings two years prior) was so large executives had to
have known,57 and that the executives had a general desire to
protect their own position58—the dissent concludes that the in-
vestors did in fact prove scienter as to the statements made by
two executives regarding the status and progress of the 787
project.59
In this case, innocent investors were left completely cheated,
bearing the entire cost of the executives’ risk-loving “over opti-
mism.” By refusing to consider liability for misleading the inves-
tors and even intentionally lying to them about then-present
facts, the majority sends a dangerous message to corporate of-
51 See Anderson, 827 F.3d. at 1255 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also id. at 1245 (majority opinion).
52 Id. at 1237 (majority opinion).
53 Id. at 1255 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001)).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.; see also Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 575 (9th Cir. 2014).
57 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1255 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106 (10th Cir.
2003).
58 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1255–56 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003).
59 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1256.
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ficers that as long as they can make statements under the guise
of opinions about the future that are not “demonstrably false,”
they will escape liability.60
Moreover, In re Zagg requires the court to consider whether
all of the facts alleged give rise to a strong inference of scienter,
“not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation,
meets that standard.”61 Simply put, the majority failed to con-
sider all of the facts holistically and prevented the investors from
recovering from their loss.62 The court also seems to ignore its
own definition of scienter: “a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or recklessness.”63 While the ma-
jority continues to harp on the “over-optimism” of the execu-
tives and emphasizes a lack of proof to their intent, only the
dissent truly tests the facts against the recklessness standard—
and it finds liability.64 So the majority ignores a critical piece of
the Section 10(b) puzzle.65 Either the executives were incompe-
tent enough in managing these projects that they did not com-
prehend the potential loss or they were so blindingly optimistic
that they failed to temper investor expectations adequately. Re-
gardless, the standard that the Tenth Circuit sets in this case
appears extremely deferential toward executives at the cost of
investors.
As it relates to the airline industry specifically, Spirit’s projects
supplied parts for three very commonly manufactured planes,
Gulfstream’s G280 and its “crown jewel,” the G650,66 and Boe-
ing’s state-of-the-art 787 “Dreamliner,” which continues to per-
vade the market.67 As more and more companies like Spirit
enter the marketplace to provide parts, and especially as these
companies want to be part of the Dreamliner trend, they have
learning curves. A company’s ability to predict, and more impor-
60 Id. at 1251–52.
61 Id. at 1237 (majority opinion); see In re Zagg, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194,
1201–02 (10th Cir. 2015).
62 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1251.
63 Id. at 1236–37 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 1255–56 (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65 Id.
66 See id. at 1235 (majority opinion); Kerry Lynch, Full Steam Ahead for Gulf-
stream’s G650, G280, AVIATION WEEK (Sept. 10, 2012), http://aviationweek.com/
blog/full-steam-ahead-gulfstream-s-g650-g280.
67 Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1235; Dan Catchpole, Boeing 787 Delays Coincided with
Spike in Airbus A330 Leases, HERALDNET (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.heraldnet.
com/business/boeing-787-delays-coincided-with-spike-in-airbus-a330-leases; see
also Zhang, supra note 13.
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tantly, stay on its curve certainly determines its likelihood of re-
peat business, but large project losses of any sort breed litigation
against executives, whether information was hidden from inves-
tors or fully disclosed.68 Anderson v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc.
seems to say that as long as statements aren’t completely ludi-
crous, the Tenth Circuit will allow executives to err on the side
of sheer optimism in addressing investors’ concerns, even when
they end up losing nearly half of a billion dollars.69
The case cautions that extra attention must be paid to execu-
tives’ statements to investors about the company’s cost and
learning curves. This rings particularly true for Boeing and its
787 project suppliers, given that the 787 project is a project that,
on Boeing’s end, has already been embroiled in delays and set-
backs.70 Boeing uses a similar accounting method to Spirit,
called “program accounting,” which calculates Dreamliner earn-
ings and costs based on “10-year forecasts of supplier contracts,
aircraft orders and options, productivity improvements, labor
contracts and market conditions.”71 This requires Boeing to de-
fend its cost curves tightly, and any projection into the long-
term future always risks major loss due to uncertainty.72 While
Boeing executives “continue to believe [the 787] will be a signif-
icant contributor to Boeing’s success for decades to come,”73
any project loss is sure to spawn litigation similar to this case.
The Tenth Circuit appears to provide some shelter for execu-
tives, but with Spirit moving off the chopping block, investors
may be looking for a new big target. They may only need to
move up the chain.
68 Robert C. Epstein, How Construction Contracts Cause Litigation, GP SOLO LAW
TRENDS & NEWS, Feb. 2005, http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/
publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/construction
contracts.html.
69 See Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1235–51.
70 See Zhang, supra note 13.
71 Ostrower, supra note 10.
72 Id.
73 Id.
